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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ERIC G. BROCKINGTON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23951 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
ERIC G. BROCKINGTON, pro se 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE P.C. (ANDREA L. LAZAROW of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHELLE SHERIDAN 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers Union, 
Local 100 (TWU) and the New York City Transit Authority (Authority)1 to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on an improper practice charge filed by Eric G. 
Brockington, which held that the TWU violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public 
1
 The Authority is made a statutory party to this proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the 
Act. 
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Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in its handling of a grievance arbitration for 
Brockington. 
EXCEPTIONS 
...T.he_T_WJJ...excjBpts..o.n.th.e..g.ro_u.nds. that the.ALJ made an erroneouaiinding of„ 
fact, that Brockington failed to establish a prima facie case and that the burden of proof 
was erroneously shifted to the TWU. The Authority excepts on the grounds that the 
ALJ's decision was incorrect as a matter of law. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision2 and are adopted by the Board, 
except to the extent specifically addressed herein. 
Brockington's charge, as amended, alleged that TWU failed to adequately 
represent him at a Step 1 grievance hearing, failed to obtain evidence he requested, 
failed to secure the attendance of witnesses for his disciplinary arbitration hearing, and 
intentionally misled him with erroneous advice concerning the strength of the Authority's 
disciplinary case against him and the possible outcome thereof. He also claimed that he 
was discharged for abandoning his train whereas other Authority employees similarly 
charged suffered lesser penalties. 
Brockington was the only witness to testify in this proceeding. His testimony, in 
narrative form, was initially unspecific and conclusory as to the manner in which TWU 
) 2 36 PERB 1J4593 (2003). 
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"misrepresented" him. He testified that the TWU did not allow him to bring witnesses 
with relevant testimony to his disciplinary grievance arbitration, did not allow him to 
present photographs of non-working Authority telephones and prevented him from 
producing evidence that other employees of the Authority committed offenses similar to 
hisand were either cleared of ihe charges, or received Jesserdjscipjinaiypenalties. 
His later testimony was somewhat more specific when describing the events that 
took place "before the case was pushed to the arbitration hearing". Prior to the hearing, 
he spoke to TWU officers Clarence Little and Irwin Lee and TWU attorney, Ed 
Pachardo. He claimed he told Pachardo "everything that I would need to clear me of 
these charges...." Specifically, Brockington testified that Pachardo did not obtain the 
sign-on log sheets for the date in question, did not secure the attendance of witnesses3 
and did not move into evidence the photographs of the inoperable phones. Brockington 
testified that, after speaking with Parmar, he knew Pachardo had not even contacted 
Parmar. 
DISCUSSION 
In Civil Service Employees Association v. PERB and Diaz, (hereinafter, Diaz)4 
the Appellate Division rejected PERB's holding that "irresponsible or grossly negligent" 
conduct may form the basis for a union's breach of the duty of fair representation. The 
court held there that "in order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair 
representation by a union, there must be a showing that the activity, or lack thereof, 
3
 Brockington requested that TWU call Parmar, his partner on the date in question, 
Thompson, a flagman who worked at the site in question, and an unnamed supervisor 
who issued radios to him that day. 
4
 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3rd Dep't, 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 
796,21 PERB lf7017 (1988). 
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which formed the basis of the charges against the union was deliberately invidious, 
arbitrary or founded in bad faith."5 
Here, it is uncontroverted that Brockington asked the TWU or its agents to secure 
certain witnesses and other evidence for his disciplinary grievance arbitration hearing 
andihat those-requests were„not actedupon. I he ALJ .acknowledged that RERBJs 
loathe to substitute its judgment for that of a union in the processing of grievances6 and 
that mere disagreement with the tactics utilized or dissatisfaction with the quality or 
extent of representation does not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.7 
Negligence or an error in judgment is insufficient to form the basis of a violation.8 
The ALJ also acknowledged that "[tjhere has been no showing of discrimination 
or claim that the TWU handled Brockington's case differently than it handled the same 
cases for other employees."9 However, the ALJ erroneously concluded that the absence 
of any demonstration by the TWU that it acted with "reason and good faith" warrants a 
finding of arbitrariness or bad faith. In so finding, the ALJ has, in effect, reversed the 
burden of proof on a necessary element of the charge without any basis in law. 
5
 132 AD2d at 432, 20 PERB ^7024, at 7039. 
6
 Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO and State of New York (Dep't of Health) (Reese), 
29 PERB 1J3027 (1996). 
7
 Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580, AFL-CIO and Centra! New York Reg. Transp. 
Auth., 32 PERB 1J3053 (1999). 
8
 CSEA (Kandel), 13 PERB 1J3049 (1980). 
9
 36 PERB U4593, at 4807 n.15. 
) 
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The Act10 and numerous decisions11 hold that a charging party has the burden to 
prove the necessary elements of the charge; i.e., that the union's actions were arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. Brockington's hearing proof fails on all counts. While 
Brockington's charge, as amended, may have alleged some deliberate behavior, his 
hearing evidence failsto establish-any. No attempt is^even made to-establish- - ... 
arbitrariness or bad faith. Simply put, his testimony and the exhibits introduced fail to 
establish arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part of the TWU in its 
representation of him. 
The cases cited by the ALJ are clearly factually distinguishable from the facts in 
the instant case. New York City Transit Authority and Transport Workers Union12 
involved the Board's reversal of an Assistant Director's deficiency dismissal of a charge. 
The Board held that the union's deliberate adjournment of a disciplinary grievance 
arbitration, under circumstances where it would have otherwise been dismissed in favor 
of the employee-union member could, if true, evidence arbitrary conduct. The reversal 
merely gave the charging party an opportunity to present his case. Here, Brockington 
has had a full opportunity to prove the allegations asserted in his pleadings. In Social 
Services Employees' Union, Local 371,™ the Board found a violation of the Act in the 
union's refusal to consider or process a grievance request and refusal to give an 
explanation. However, the case hinged upon the Board's acceptance of the hearing 
10
 Act, §209-a.2(c). 
11
 See, e.g., Grasselv. PERB, 301 AD2d 522, 36 PERB1J7002 (2d Dep't 2003); UFT, 
Local 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO (Oparaji), 35 PERB fl3042 (2002). 
12
 27 PERB P007 (1994). 
13
 11 PERB H3004(1978). 
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officer's finding that the union failed to process the grievance because of animus toward 
the charging party. One of the union's officials obstructed the grievance request 
because he felt the charging party was going to testify against the union in an unrelated 
proceeding< In the instant case, we have no proof of such a bad faith motive. 
-The TWU's representation otBrockingtonfor his_disciplihary_grievance„may have 
been deficient, but we have no factual basis upon which to determine whether that 
deficiency was the result of negligence, gross negligence,.incompetence or some other 
cause. As the record in this matter contains no evidence of arbitrary, discriminatory or 
bad faith conduct by TWU in its handling of Brockington's case, there is no violation of 
§§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act established. 
Based upon our review of the record, we grant the exceptions filed by TWU and 
the Authority and reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 23, 2004 
Albany, New York 
""" lu^^C^t 
ichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHAMPTON TOWN PUBLIC SAFETY 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-arid-
CASE NO. C-5248 
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
) Intervenor. 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A, MAURO of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
VINCENT TOOMEY and CHRISTINE A. GAETA, ESQS., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. GRAIN of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Southampton Town Public 
Safety Benevolent Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing a petition filed by the Association seeking, as amended, to 
fragment, for purposes of representation, eighteen public safety dispatchers (hereafter, 
.) 
Case No. C-5248 - 2 
dispatchers)1 from a long-standing unit of approximately 230 employees of the Town of 
Southampton (Town), represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
EXCEPTIONS 
Thei Assocfatibn[excepts>"to the ALJ's "decision on the law and1he"facts. The 
Association contends that the ALJ misinterpreted the facts and, thereby, misapplied our 
case law op uniting criteria. The Town and CSEA support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's decision, dismissing the 
petition. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision2 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to our consideration of the exceptions. 
The Association's petition, as amended, alleges that CSEA should be decertified 
as the representative of the dispatchers and that the Association should be certified as 
the exclusive bargaining representative of the dispatchers. The Association argues in 
support of its petition that CSEA has inadequately represented the dispatchers by 
excluding them from the negotiating process, by agreeing to "give back" items won in 
grievance arbitration affecting dispatchers only, by refusing to process valid dispatcher 
grievances and by ineffectively processing membership applications from dispatchers. 
1
 The in-issue titles are Town Public Safety Dispatcher I and Town Public Safety 
Dispatcher II. 
236PERBtf4016(2003). 
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\ The Association was organized in 1988. At the time of filing the instant petition, 
the CSEA unit that includes the dispatchers had existed for approximately 30 years. On 
May 16, 1988, the dispatchers filed a petition seeking to be removed from CSEA's unit 
and have certified a new exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of dispatchers, arguing 
inade'qoateTepTesentation-by-eSEA-The'Town'and-'GSEA-opposed-thatiJetitioTT:""- ~ 
In his decision,3 the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) found that, while some of the dispatchers were dissatisfied with CSEA's 
representation and internal affairs, that sentiment alone was not sufficient to justify the 
fragmentation of the dispatchers from a long-standing unit, over the Town's objection on 
administrative convenience grounds. 
As then, the dispatchers' primary duties continue to be to operate radio 
equipment, to relay information for the Town Police, as well as for police in other 
localities, and to maintain records concerning these calls. The dispatchers work at 
police headquarters and their work schedule and supervision are the same as that of 
police officers, who are represented by another employee organization. They also wear 
uniforms similar to those of police officers. While they are not the only uniformed 
personnel in CSEA's unit, they are the only unit members required to work on a 24-hour 
basis. 
The Association's president, John Baucum, testified, that the principal reason 
that the Association filed the petition was the dispatchers' dissatisfaction with the 
proposed work schedule that was agreed upon in the negotiations for the 2001-2004 
3
 Town of Southampton, 22 PERB 1J4026, aff'd, 22 PERB fi3052 (1989). 
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collective bargaining agreement. The other reason was a restriction in that agreement 
placed on compensatory time received by some dispatchers for the half-hour meal 
period. Lastly, the dispatchers felt that they were not being represented properly 
because, for example, the current unit president, David Wilcox, at a grievance 
arbitration over compensatory timefor worked lunch periodsrmadea comment that the" 
dispatchers were "double dipping",4 and that some former CSEAunit presidents had 
made disparaging remarks because dispatchers work fewer days per year than other 
unit members.5 
Guy DiCosola, a CSEA labor relations specialist, testified about the negotiated 
change in the work schedule. He stated that, during the second negotiating session for 
the 2001-2004 collective bargaining agreement, the Town had submitted a proposal that 
changed the dispatchers' work schedule. Prior to the third session, Linda Armstrong, a 
dispatcher and negotiating team alternate, submitted to DiCosola a proposal from the 
dispatchers/He recommended against offering the proposal to the Town in negotiations 
because it was merely a codification of a favorable arbitrator's award and he feared that 
the Town would make a counterproposal that would negate the benefit of the arbitrator's 
award.6 Armstrong's proposal would establish a new limit of 242 days for dispatchers 
hired after 1998. Over DiCosola's reservations, Armstrong insisted that the proposal be 
4
 Transcript, p. 64. 
5
 Transcript, p. 75. 
6
 The February 2000 arbitration award was the result Of a grievance brought by CSEA 
on behalf of the dispatchers. The award held that the Town could increase the work 
schedule of dispatchers hired after February 18, 1998, by nine days a year without 
additional compensation. Dispatchers hired prior to that date would continue to work 
between 232 and 236 days a year. 
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submitted and DiCosola acquiesced. The Town then submitted a counterproposal to 
change the two-tier maximum number of days set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement to a work schedule of 260 days for all dispatchers. 
Armstrong testified that during the negotiations the meal break allowance for 
difpatchers'was'chahged7 
1998 with a one-half hour lunch break without the loss of compensatory time.7 
Eliminating the differential was an issue insisted upon by the Town in negotiations. 
The parties negotiated on all the proposals until impasse was declared. It then 
became apparent that the negotiations would not result in an agreement and would 
likely go to a legislative imposition unless certain concessions sought by the Town with 
respect to the dispatchers were agreed upon, specifically the changes in the schedule 
and the meal break allowance. A compromise proposal of a 245-day work schedule for 
dispatchers guaranteed that dispatchers hired after 1998, who were the majority of 
dispatchers, would hot work more than 245 days. The dispatchers were also to receive 
overtime retroactive to the coitimencement of negotiations (18 months) at a new higher 
hourly rate. Also, the night differential for dispatchers was made retroactive to January 
1, 2001. No other group of employees within the bargaining unit received retroactive 
payments as the result of these negotiations. In addition, the entire unit, including the 
dispatchers, obtained gains in compensation, health insurance8 and other areas. The 
7
 Transcript, p. 485. 
8
 CSEA obtained a major concession regarding health insurance with the Town 
agreeing to pay 100% of the cost of the individual health coverage effective January 1, 
2003. 
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negotiating committee did not make a recommendation on the proposed collective 
bargaining agreement when it was presented to the membership for a vote. 
The record establishes that, of the six or seven regular members of CSEA's 
negotiating team, one member was a dispatcher. Also, out of three alternate members 
ofthe team, one'Blternate> wasiadispatcher; in the totaTunit;th;ere are approximately 
fifteen dispatchers in the Town Police Department and between 260 and 280 total unit 
members. 
Amstrong, Linda Tarpey and Dale Simchick all testified about their respective 
union positions. Armstrong was a shop steward for CSEA unit members covering a 
period of about 16 years. She also identified other dispatchers who served as shop 
stewards (Simchick, Tarpey and John BandroWski). Armstrong ran for election to the 
position of unit vice-president; however, she lost by one vote. She admitted that she 
encountered no interference from CSEA in seeking union office. 
Tarpey testified that, during her 13 years of employment with the Town, she was 
not aware of any instance where a dispatcher was not permitted to run for office in the 
CSEA unit. She was elected vice-president of the CSEA unit. Simchick testified that 
she was elected recording secretary to the executive bOard of the CSEA unit. In that 
position, she kept notes of executive board meetings and negotiation sessions. 
Wilcox testified that, once it was brought to CSEA's attention, he recognized a 
problem with certain membership cards. However, this problem was not unique to the 
Case No. C-5248 -7 
dispatchers. It was a unit-wide problem that Wilcox has corrected with the help of the 
Town and the CSEA unit treasurer.9 
DISCUSSION 
This petition i$ the second effort by the dispatchers to decertify CSEA and obtain 
a "separater bargaining unitof employeesijnthetitles of Town-Public SafetyDispatcher I 
and Town Public Safety Dispatcher II. We dismissed the first petition in 1989, finding 
that the record failed to establish inadequate representation sufficient to warrant 
fragmentation of the dispatchers from the overall CSEA unit.10 In that petition, a conflict 
of interest and inadequate representation were also alleged. 
In this petition, the Association has recast these arguments by alleging that the 
dispatchers have been excluded from the bargaining process, that CSEA agreed to 
"give back" items won through grievance arbitration, that CSEA has failed to process 
grievances and, lastly, CSEA has been ineffective in representing the unique interests 
of dispatchers. 
This Board has long adhered to two ruling principles in deciding 
uniting questions. First, we have held that "[i]t is the policy of the 
Act to find appropriate the largest unit permitting for effective 
negotiations." (citation omitted) The second long-standing 
principle to which we have adhered is that fragmentation of existing 
bargaining units will not be granted in the absence of compelling 
evidence of the need to do so. (citation omitted) We have held that 
compelling need is generally established by proving the existence 
of a conflict of interest or inadequate representation, (citation 
omitted) When these principles have been applied in the creation 
and continuation of appropriate units, they have, at the very least, 
contributed to stability in public sector labor relations and have 
9
 Transcript, pp. 601-02. 
10
 Supra note 3. 
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focused the parties' attention on substantive negotiations rather 
than on the process of adding to or subtracting from units.11 
On this record, we find no evidence of inadequate representation by CSEA of the 
dispatchers. In support of its allegation of inadequate representation, the Association 
points to Dicosola's lack of support for the dispatchers' work schedule proposal and the 
alteration of that work schedule and their lunch break compensatory time in the 2001-
2004 collective bargaining agreement. The Association also relies on Wilcox's remarks 
that dispatchers were "double-dipping" concerning the compensatory time received for 
the meal break, and, that they work fewer hours than other unit employees. The 
Association further contends that CSEA denied the dispatchers representation in 
negotiations, but the record fails to support this contention. Tarpey was a permanent 
member of the negotiating team, as well as an officer in the unit. Armstrong, a former 
CSEA shop steward, and Baucum were alternates or participants as advisors. We do 
not find, under the circumstances, that CSEA ignored the dispatchers as a group within 
the unit. 
What is clear from the record is that this round of negotiations between CSEA 
and the Town was difficult. CSEA obtained a major concession regarding health 
insurance. DiCosola's testimony outlined the negotiations culminating with mediation. 
While he was aware of the dispatchers' adamant position with respect to the work 
schedule and compensatory time, the compromise proposal worked out with the 
mediator was a recognition that the interests of a minority of the bargaining unit must 
11
 State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreational and Historical Preservation 
Comm.), 22 PERB fi3043, at 3098 (1989). 
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sometimes be subordinated to the interests of the majority in order to bring closure to 
the negotiating process.12 In the bargaining process, it is simply not possible to satisfy 
all the interests of a subgroup all of the time.13 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALU. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition for certification/decertification 
must be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 23, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
jDhn T. Mitchell, Member 
12
 Deer Park Union Free Sen. Dist, 22 PERB lf3014 (1989). 
13
 State of New York, supra note 11, at 3099. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS OEXORNING 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5331 
CORNING COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Professional Educators of Corning 
Community College has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5331 - 2 -
Included: All full-time teaching faculty. 
Excluded: Division chairpersons, faculty on administrative assignment who 
teach less than 50% of a full-time teaching load. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the ab^\^ named public ernployer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Professional Educators of Corning Community College. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 23, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
